Using a panel of non-farm household businesses for Vietnam, this paper sheds light on the links between households' and entrepreneurs' social networks and household business performance. We address three related questions. One first question is whether we can find evidence of a differentiated effect of employment of members of the extended family versus hired workers on the business performance. Then we examine the extent, intensity and determinants of potential redistributive pressure exerted by the extended family, and borne by households running household businesses, notably under the form of inter-household transfers received and given. Finally, we identify the specific effects of redistributive pressure (from family and kinship ties, the social network capital, and the community) on the household businesses' technical efficiency. A cross-cutting issue is that all these analyses are performed separately for formal and informal businesses so as to ask whether social network support is more critical in the informal economy. We find evidence of a productivity differential between family and hired labour in the informal sector. In addition, the data do not support the hypothesis of substitutability between family and hired labour, which seems consistent with the idea that managerial and supervisory tasks may be mainly performed by family members. The results of transfer equations confirm the high propensity of households to transfer given their available resources and are consistent with the idea that family, kinship but also community level features exert an effect on the size and type of transfers to and from households. Finally, using information on the entrepreneurs' social capital and looking at firm efficiency, we confirm the importance of unlocking financial constraints and improving access to professional support for successful household entrepreneurship.
Introduction
Worldwide micro and small enterprises (MSE) employ members of the extended family -paid or unpaid. This may happen for different reasons, for instance because entrepreneurs think that family labour is more reliable and offers flexibility that is difficult to find on the labour market. Of course, the opposite may also be true, that family members are rather less motivated and, given the close relationship, difficult to discipline. They might then have been hired because the extended family simply expects jobs in such a firm either because egalitarian norms require it or because the extended family helped set up the business and wants to be rewarded for that effort once the company is running. Finally, it could happen, in particular in less developed countries, because labour markets are incomplete and so the only way to recruit workers is via the family.
The empirical literature that investigates the costs and benefits of family labour is relatively thin and the little evidence that exists is not conclusive. In this paper we investigate this issue for the case of Vietnam, a country where family and kinship support is widely seen as a key ingredient of entrepreneurial success. The case of Vietnam is also interesting in other respects. In the last decades, Vietnam has experienced spectacular social, economic and political changes. Impressive economic growth in the last decade has entailed a remarkable drop in poverty figures, drastic changes of the labour market structure, but also a surge in inequalities as trade liberalization and world integration have expanded. Reforms since the doi moi (process of moving away from central control towards a market economy) aimed at allowing entrepreneurship to flourish but no specific policies were designed to assist the private domestic sector, in particular the household business sector (Oudin, 1999; Cling et al., 2010) . In this formerly centrally planned economy, loans are rare as there is almost no support for the acquisition of physical capital by finance institutions (bank or micro-finance). Hence, household businesses still self-finance most of their accumulated capital.
This lack of access to formal sources of credit has repercussions on employment practices. The lack of a formal capital market has indeed reinforced the development of the private sector through the proliferation of new small enterprises, rather than through growth of existing ones. This resulted in a steady growth of self-employment for middle-aged workers. However, in the absence of external capital, few young people have the resources required to establish their own enterprise and they often have to rely on kinship ties to obtain a job. Twenty years ago, analysing a survey of private entrepreneurs in Vietnam, Ronnås (1992) already noted that recommendations by friends, relatives and other workers and personal contacts remained by far the most important ways of recruiting new workers, both in urban and rural areas. Nowadays, this hiring practice has probably developed significantly as Vietnamese workers have to cope with a rapidly changing socio-economic environment and the associated risks increase due to important labour market mutations.
While there is large consensus in the literature that social networks provide a wide range of benefits by reducing transaction costs, facilitating the access to information, helping to overcome the dilemmas of collective action, generating learning spinoffs and providing informal insurance 1 , much less is known about the possible adverse effects of family and kinship ties, in particular for entrepreneurial success. In this paper, we focus on the productivity of family labour in comparison to hired labour. Can we find evidence of a differentiated effect of employment of members of the extended family (or unpaid workers) on household businesses' performance? We then examine the extent, intensity and determinants of potential redistributive pressure borne by households running household businesses. Finally, we look at whether family and kinship ties and other dimensions of social networks, such as 'professional network capital' and community level characteristics, influence the distribution of technical efficiency across household firms. To our knowledge, there are few empirical studies which have specifically addressed these questions, in particular using a panel sample of formal and informal firms.
Can we identify differentiated effects depending on the informality status of the businesses? A cross-cutting issue in our analysis is indeed that we observe formal and informal non-farm household businesses (NFHB).
2 Formal NFHBs are firms that are registered with the tax authority and might have better access to input and output markets than informal firms. This differentiation is interesting as it allows us to investigate the possible existence of heterogeneity in the effects described above depending on whether the household business operates in the formal or in the informal economy. One may think for instance that social networks are more critical in the informal economy as there is there a lack of formal institutions and/or mechanisms supporting access to business inputs and other necessary resources, such as physical and human capital, but also public infrastructure. An interesting question is then to examine whether the hypothetical adverse effects of family and kinship ties may be more prevalent in an informal context. While there are good reasons to believe that family and kinship redistribution -either under the forms of employed labour or in-cash and in-kind transfers -could be important in households running informal businesses (assuming that their informality would facilitate the avoidance of labour and tax regulations in the process of hiring and transferring household resources), the reverse might also be true: formal (and potentially better performing) businesses may foster demands from the kin as the business becomes more visible and attractive. Hence, the benefits and costs of family labour may differ between formal and informal businesses, We start by presenting the literature (Section 2) and discussing what we understand by social networks, in particular the notions of family and kinship ties as opposed to the broader concept of 'social network capital'. The small literature dealing with the adverse effect of family and kinship ties on entrepreneurship is reported and we further relate it to the question of productivity of family versus hired labour. We then present the context of entrepreneurship in Vietnam, report on the construction of our panel of household businesses, and comment on our data (Section 3). In the first part of our econometric analysis (Section 4), after presenting the econometric strategy, we estimate the returns to different types of labour. In a next step (Section 5), we examine the determinants of the transfers received and given by households running businesses in order to identify key determinants of potential redistributive pressure exerted by the kinship ties and extended family on the NFHBs. This allows us to come up with a set of social network proxies for sharing norms that we use to observe, in a last step (Section 6), whether and why business managers may use factor inputs in a technically inefficient and sub-optimal way. In case we find evidence for a sub-optimal use, it may hint to adverse incentive effects related to family labour and/or other social network dimensions. Such adverse incentive effects could arise if entrepreneurs feel that everything they earn needs to be shared with the kinship network or that higher earnings may even attract more family members that have to be employed be the firm. This part of the paper will rely on the estimation of the household businesses' technical efficiency using the panel structure of the data. The paper ends with robustness checks and a summary of the findings and some policy conclusions emanating from the results (Section 8).
Review of the related literature: social network capital, kinship
ties and family vs. hired labour
Social network capital, family and kinship ties
A significant literature has emphasized the role of social networks in access to jobs and professional trajectories. It is now well established that there is a widespread use of friends, relatives and other acquaintances to search for jobs or to help employers locate prospective employees (Ioannides and Loury, 2004) . From a sociological point of view, the seminal work of Granovetter (1973 Granovetter ( , 1995 develops the idea that the labour market outcomes of using social contacts depend on the link between individuals and their contacts, and more precisely on the strength of their tie. Granovetter defines strong ties as links with nearby people -family and friends -that involve repeated and frequent interactions on a number of different levels. Links with infrequent interactions or with low intimacy, the 'weak ties', tend to bridge individuals across social groups of close interpersonal relationships. Granovetter brought out 'the strength of weak ties' argument that means that weak ties are the most informative and thus the most useful for finding a job. While information from strong ties is likely to be very similar to the information one already has, weak ties are more likely to open up information sources that are very different from one's own. In this paper, when we deal with family labour, we refer to family and kinship ties, or 'strong ties' following Granovetter's terminology, as opposed to the broader concept of 'social network capital'. 3 In line with La Ferrara (2007), we use family and kinship ties to refer to any form of blood relationship. At one end, we situate family ties as the most proximate type of relationship. At the other end, we situate kinship ties as a rather distant type that is characterized by socially recognized relationships based on supposed as well as actual genealogical ties. The main difference of family and kinship ties, on the one hand, and a generic set of individuals who interact, on the other hand, is that family and kinship ties can be seen as largely exogenous and cannot be freely changed or only at a high psychological cost (La Ferrara, 2007) .
Empirical evidence of social network effects on job access and entrepreneurship
There is now a large literature dealing with the broader concept of 'social network capital' and its effect on job access and allocation. Looking at the empirics, the main consensus is that using social network capital may be productive in findings jobs. Those who found jobs through personal contacts were generally less likely to quit (Datcher, 1983; Devine and Kiefer, 1991) and had longer tenure in their jobs (Simon and Warner, 1992) . More recent studies on network effect discusses the importance of network size, its geographical proximity, the resource endowments of contacts and the nature of the links between contacts to explain differences in the effects of social networks (Maurin and Moschion, 2009; de Marti and Zenou, 2009 ). However, most of these studies deal with developed countries. Some recent studies can now be found for Africa (Bourquin and Ferrant, 2010; Grimm et al., 2012; Pasquier-Doumer, 2012; Nordman and Pasquier-Doumer, 2012; Berrou and Combarnous, 2012) . Using survey data for seven cities of West Africa and focusing on internal migrants, Grimm et al. (2012) found some evidence that family and kinship ties within the city rather enhance labour effort and the use of physical capital.
However, the stronger the ties to the village of origin, measured by the closeness to the village, the lower input use which is supporting the 'forced redistribution' hypothesis.
For Asia, empirical findings are scarce and do not necessarily confirm Granovetter's predictions (Bian and Ang, 1997) . Research even remains divided on the precise nature and roles of kinship networks in the mechanisms of facilitating (or not) labour market integration and/or entrepreneurial success. In Japan, Watanabe (1994) found that respondents in a 1985 Tokyo survey tended to learn job information through ties based on family and community networks more often than others ties, and jobs channelled through this type of ties were also of higher quality than those channelled through others ties. In China, where jobs were assigned by state authority before the emergence of labour markets in the early 1990s, Bian and Ang (1997) found that job seekers who had close relationships with job-assigning authority at higher levels tended to obtain better jobs. The authors argue that, in Chinese culture, weak ties are most unlikely to facilitate exchanges of favors that require a sense of trust and moral obligations between exchangers. Because giving information or influence to help someone change jobs is understood in the context of exchange of favors, weak ties are unlikely to be helpful in mobility processes. Fukuyama (1995) also considers that, in China, family is the pivot of all the social relationships and that key positions are attributed according to the family links and not to skills. Studies of other East Asian countries or areas have also indicated similar tendencies about the importance of strong relative to weak ties job allocation (Berger and Hsiao, 1988; Wong, 1990; Xiong, Sun and Xu, 1986) .
For Vietnam, some papers have stressed the efficient function of social network capital. However, one can wonder whether the doi moi has shaped the relationship between social networks and individuals' professional trajectories, in particular entrepreneurship, for those workers who have to cope with a changing economic environment. Turner (2009) shows how traders of the ancient quarters of Hanoi have managed to remain in place and to offset adverse trends caused by many upheavals (during the war and socialist periods, as well as the impact of trade liberalization). Turner and Nguyen (2005) illustrate the operation of strong social network capital amongst immediate family and friends to help with the establishment and expansion of an enterprise. Using data on about four hundreds small businesses, Appold and Nguyen (2005) measure the amount, types, and patterns of interaction between business owners and their internal and external partners. They find that these small business owners use 'social embedding' to create a safety net for environmental contingencies not related to specific relationships. Digregorio (2006) and Fanchette and Stedman (2009) shed light on the dynamics of craft villages in the suburb of Hanoi which are organised in clusters specialised in one activity based on the guarantees of long-term and ongoing relationships. Knorringa and van Staveren (2005) show that all segments of the footwear industry performed quite well in recent years thanks to strong and hierarchically organized associations. Finally, Zylberberg (2010) focuses on coordination and informal arrangements at the village level after large natural disasters. He argues that repeated exposure to the passage of typhoons induces a community to reinforce its capacity to monitor contract enforcement, and thus individuals to reinforce their social capital.
The adverse effects of family and kinship ties on entrepreneurship
The idea that family and kinship ties may also imply adverse incentive effects is relatively old. It is quite often mentioned in the anthropological literature, was emphasized by modernization theorists, and was developed in the field of economic sociology and social network analysis as the downside of strong ties, which are also often referred to as 'bonding ties'. 4 More recently, this question has been taken up by a few economists (see e.g. Platteau, 2000; Hoff and Sen, 2006; Luke and Munshi, 2006) . Although these authors admit that family and kinship ties can be a vehicle for social contracts of mutual insurance in a context where market for these goods and services do not exist, they argue that family and kinship ties may become an important obstacle in the process of firm development. Members of the kin system that achieve economic success in the modern sector may be confronted with sharing obligations by less successful fellows. This may imply to remit money, to find urban jobs or to host them in the city home. The hypothesis is then that the need to meet such demands can adversely affect the incentives of kin members to pursue and develop their economic activity in the modern sector. Gargiulo and Benassi (1997) argue that strong family and kinship ties may also limit the entrepreneur's ability to keep control on the composition of his business network and jeopardize his adaptability to changing task environments. Opting out of such kin systems and refusing to comply with these obligations may be possible but may result in strong sanctions and high psychological costs and the kin group may want to prevent this ex ante by manipulating the relevant exit-barriers (as in Hoff and Sen's (2006) model).
To our knowledge, there are little studies that specifically addressed the potential adverse effects of family and kinship ties on entrepreneurial activities. Duflo et al. (2009) show that impatient Kenyan farmers forgo highly profitable investments in fertilizer, arguing that the impatience is partly rooted in the difficulty of protecting savings from consumption demands. Di Falco and Bulte (2011) find evidence that kinship size is associated with higher budget shares for nonsharable goods. Baland, Guirkinger and Mali (2007) analyze borrowing behaviour and find that some people take up credits even without liquidity constraint -just to signal to their kin that they are unable to provide financial assistance. Anderson and Baland (2002) provide some evidence that women in Kenya participate in a 'Rotating Saving and Credit Association' (Rosca) to protect savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. Fafchamps (2002) finds a negative association between perceived 'fear of predation by relatives' and value added among agricultural traders in Madagascar, however this is not the focus of his paper and he does not further discuss this result. In a randomized control trial similar to the one described above, Fafchamps et al. (2011) find for female entrepreneurs in Ghana a lower impact of cash transfers on profits compared to in-kind transfers as cash transfers seem to end up going to household expenses and transfers. However, the authors conclude that this is more driven by a lack of selfcontrol than external pressure. Lastly, Berrou and Combarnous (2012) also explicitly distinguishe between family and kinship ties on the one hand and business and sociability ties on the other. In a sample of informal entrepreneurs in Bobo-Dioulasso (Burkina Faso), they state that family and kinship ties represent only a quarter of all ties entrepreneurs rely on. They find positive effects for both types of ties on value added and earnings, and emphasize the role of kinship ties for start-up resources. However, they also state that more educated entrepreneurs appear to rely on weaker ties. This may suggest their capacity to extract themselves from existing community constraints and to develop more flexible ties.
The productivity of family versus hired workers
To our knowledge, there are very little studies that specifically addressed the potential adverse effects of employing family workers for entrepreneurial success, especially in developing countries. Still, some literature has investigated the nature and effect of family versus hired labour in firm performance. However, this literature relates essentially to farm businesses, while the purpose of our study is to investigate this question for non-farm household businesses.
A priori, one might expect family and hired labour to play differently on business performance, because they may have different compositions of male and female, adult versus child, and skilled versus unskilled labour. In developing countries, females and children, for instance, may constitute a larger proportion of family than of hired labour. This would tend to drive down the marginal product of family relative to hired labour if the marginal productivity of women and children is lower than that of adult males (Deolalikar and Vijverberg, 1987) . Besides, the skill differential between family and hired labour may also be an important source of heterogeneity in the productivity of workers. Fafchamps (2002) suggests for agricultural traders in Madagascar that family members work less hard than hired workers, which could be explained by a familial pressure to distribute jobs that leads to a number of workers uncorrelated with the necessary amount of work to produce.
But other theoretical arguments can be put forward, sometimes contradicting the common assumption that hired labour is necessarily more productive than family labour. Moral hazard and their associated monitoring costs are hence mechanisms enlightening plausible greater productivity of family versus hired labour. Johnston and Leroux (2007) report for instance that, for farmers, family labour can be more efficient than hired labour as it is assumed to be better incentivised and so will not shirk (see also Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986) . The reason for superior incentives is that family labour will share the income generated by the farm as they may be 'residual claimants to profits' (Binswanger and Deininger, 1993) . Consequently, there will be shared incentives between entrepreneurs and workers (other household members) and so little need for additional supervision. 5 The composition of tasks performed by both types of labour may also be considered. Since family workers may perform management and supervisory duties (particularly the household head), their work may have larger effects on output than that of hired workers, who may only perform manual tasks. The performance of managerial and supervisory tasks by family members may then reduce the substitutability between family and hired labour, an assumption that we will test with the Vietnamese data. All this would explain why it is not clear that with family labour the entrepreneur would face supervision advantages, which were thought to come as family labour would share the benefits of work.
Hence, as Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987) argue, it seems difficult to predict a priori which of the two types of labour will have a greater effect on business performance. Up till now, there are a small number of studies testing the existence of differences in productivity between hired and family labour, but for farm-plants essentially. Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987) is one of these rare examples of using microeconomic farm-level data on heterogeneous labour inputs for developing countries (India and Malaysia). They show that there is an efficiency difference between hired and family labour and so reject the idea of labour homogeneity. They find that the labour of other members is a complement to hired labour and a substitute for the head's (manager's) labour within the labour services production function. Their results support the idea that family labour is involved to a greater extent in management and supervisory tasks than hired labour. Similarly, Thapa (2003) on Nepal finds that hired labour is less efficient than family labour. For Vietnam, a rather early study (Brown and Salkin, 1974) estimates Cobb-Douglas production functions for paddy transplant producers in South Vietnam, using family and hired labour as separate inputs. They obtain insignificant coefficients ranging in magnitude from 0.04 to 0.01 for family labour but significant ones for hired labour (ranging from 0.15 to 0.22). Using a sample of fish firms for Ghana, a recent study, Onumah et al. (2010) , finds that output elasticities for hired and family labour are both significant but not statistically different from each other. Thus, there is some evidence of a productivity differential between family and hired labour, although there is no consensus in the literature on the direction or magnitude of this differential. Cling et al., 2010). 7 At the national level, the vast majority of informal HBs consist of just one own-account worker, working at home or outdoors in the street. Not all HBs have to register. Two kinds of households are exempt: those earning less than a certain amount set at district level (which cannot be below the minimum wage), street vendors and motorbike taxis (xe ôm). Excluding the sectors exempt from registration, the proportion of informal HB heads earning more than the minimum wage provides an indicator of the percentage of 'illegal' informal HBs (upper bound estimator). Cling et al. (2010) suggest that up to 78 percent of informal HBs could be operating illegally nationwide. In general, informal HBs benefit from the haziness surrounding the issue of registration regulations.
Entrepreneurship in

Constructing the panel of non-farm household businesses
This paper uses the data available from two rounds of the Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS 2004 and 2006) . These surveys are LSMS surveys' type and have the reputation of being one of the best LSMS surveys in developing countries. In terms of sample design, the VHLSS is a classical three-stage stratified random survey, covering the ordinary households at the national level. 8 The sample size is quite large with 45,000 households surveyed in the full sample each year. A detailed questionnaire (including expenditures and other subject specific modules) has been applied to a random subsample of around 9,000 households. The construction of the panel of household businesses follows the method applied in Nguyen, Nordman and Roubaud (2011) to construct a three-year panel dataset at both household and individual levels.
9 This is a complex process which consists of two main steps: in the first step, we match different databases from different modules for each year, and in a second step we match the years. In a nutshell, matching the 2004 and 2006 waves has been achieved on the basis of three merging keys: household identifier, business head identifier, and industry code. We provide further details on 6 In Vietnam, the informal sector is defined as all private unincorporated enterprises that produce at least some of their goods and services for sale or barter, are not registered (no business licence) and are engaged in non-agricultural activities. See Cling et al. (2010) for more details. 7 Vijverberg (2005) draws on the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) to estimate the number of NFHBs at 9.3 million. The Annual Household Business Survey (AHBS) estimates this number at 2.9 million for the same year (GSO, 2006) . Using a methodology which adopts a mixed household/enterprise survey principles (LFS2007, a 1-2-3 Survey scheme), Cling et al. (2010) show that the informal sector accounts for almost a quarter of all main jobs (11 million jobs out of a total of 46 million jobs): there are 8.4 million informal NFHBs (of a total number of 10.3 million NFHBs), of which 7.4 million are held by a head of NFHB in his/her main job and 1 million in his/her second job. 8 The primary sample units are the communes/wards, the secondary sample units are the census enumeration areas or villages and the tertiary sample units correspond to households. 9 We also tried to construct a three-wave panel of household businesses by mobilizing also the 2002 VHLSS. The results were, however, unsatisfying as we found many differences in the content of the considered modules between our procedure and the difficulties arisen in Table A1 in Appendix. Our empirical analysis is finally based on a two-year balanced panel comprising 1138 NFHBs, thus a total of 2276 observations. In terms of contents, Table A2 in Appendix reports on the different available questionnaire modules for the two years. The core modules, which are included in both rounds, provide information on the main characteristics of the households and the NFHBs such as the households' transfers and remittances, the NFHBs' branch of activity, operations, business registration (information used for distinguishing formal and informal businesses), which allow us to construct economic variables of business outcomes. An additional module, available for 2004 only, provides detailed information on various qualitative aspects of NFHBs' activities such as business history, market, involvement in association and contacts with functional agencies, and difficulties faced by the entrepreneurs. This information will be used as the NFHBs' measures of social network capital. Finally, to reduce a possible bias due to measurement and reporting errors in the value added and important explanatory variables, notably inputs, we trim the data and drop influential outliers and observations with high leverage points from our sample that we identify by the DFITS-statistic. As suggested by Belsley et al. (1980) , we use a cutoff-value
, with k the degrees of freedom (plus 1) and N the number of observations. Using the estimates of a production function, this procedure removes 75 NFHBs from our initial balanced panel sample. Then, we use a regression panel sample of 2108 observations.
3.3
Descriptive statistics of the panel sample and social network proxies Table A3 in Appendix reports descriptive statistics computed separately for the pooled samples of formal and informal NFHBs. We focus on four groups of variables: the NFHBs' economic characteristics, the entrepreneurs' socio-demographic characteristics, and those related to the associated households.
As regards household businesses' characteristics, the statistics are in line with stylized facts in the literature on non-farm household enterprises and the informal sector (Oostendorp et al., 2009; Tran and Nguyen, 2008) . They show that NFHBs tend to be small in terms of both factors of production (labour and physical capital) and generated outcomes. The statistics also shed light on significant gaps between formal and informal NFHBs in their main input factors. The average total number of workers including the employer is 2.1 for formal NFHBs and only 1.37 for informal NFHBs. The difference between the two segments of NFHBs is also revealed by the higher propensity of formal businesses to use hired workers (on average 0.7 versus 0.14). However, both NFHBs rely on unpaid workers a lot, with proportions of this labour in the total number of workers amounting respectively to 85 and 96 percent.
Regarding 'paid' and 'unpaid' labour, ideally, one would like to know the actual relationship of the employees with the entrepreneur, and to be able to define groups of employees according to age, sex, education, experience, and maybe the type of contract they hold. Unfortunately, the VHLSSs do not provide such detailed information. We then have to make the assumption that the unpaid employees have a kin relationship with the entrepreneur (relatives). Of course, this does not preclude that paid workers could be family or kin workers. For this reason, we refer to this category as 'hired' workers and not as 'non-kin workers'. Using the household questionnaire addressed to all household members, it is nonetheless possible to calculate for each household the number of individuals employed as self-employed in other households, as self-employed in a household business (any), and those employed as wage workers in the public or private sectors.
This can be computed for both main and secondary jobs. We then verified these numbers for each household of our panel and computed pair-wise correlation coefficients of each computed variable with the two main variables of interest (inputs), the number of 'paid' and 'unpaid' employees of the NFHBs. The results were comforting: among all the computed variables (number of self-employed in other households, number of self-employed in household businesses, number of wage workers in private and public enterprises), only the number of workers in any household businesses was positively and significantly correlated with the number of 'unpaid' workers declared by the NFHB's head (correlation coefficient of 0.49, significant at the 1 percent level). Other correlations coefficients with the 'paid' worker variable of the NFHBs turned out to be insignificant. Besides, these results hold if we consider both main and secondary jobs. In a nutshell, given the Vietnamese social norms and looking at the data, we believe that considering 'unpaid' workers as having any form of kinship ties with the entrepreneur is not a strong assumption.
Looking at other input factors, notably physical capital, we only know the amount of capital stock initially invested in the business. This information is collected during the 2004 wave. As information on investment in fixed assets during the current year was not included in both years, we cannot actually construct a variable measuring the stock of current physical capital used by the NFHBs. Instead, we construct a proxy of physical capital using available information (in both years) on the households' value of fixed assets, such as household appliances or a motor bike. This variable, used together with the NFHBs' initial capital stock in the regressions, proves to be a fairly good proxy of current physical capital as indicated by the estimates of the production functions in Section 4. The statistics for these variables show a significant gap between formal and informal NFHBs. The mean value of informal NFHBs' initial investment amounts to 2230 thousands VND, whereas the corresponding figure is about five times higher for the formal NFHBs. Similarly, the value of fixed assets of households running a formal business is almost twice that of households running an informal one (respectively, 18977 versus 10500 thousands VND). Hence, we observe that there is much less disparity when the comparison between the two types of NFHBs is based on households' assets rather than on business' initial capital.
Turning to indicators of business outcomes, a common view on formal and informal NFHBs is that this sector of small-scale businesses is rather unstable. Interesting results are revealed when looking at value added and productivity indicators. We measure annual value added as the sum of the entrepreneur's earnings for the past twelve months, from which we deduct the value of selfconsumption and intermediate costs (such as material, small and non-durable tools, electricity, water, etc.). 10 At the aggregate level, our figures indicate that a formal NFHB generates a value added near three times higher than that of an informal business on average. This result slightly differs, but somewhat corroborates findings from exhaustive surveys of household businesses and informal sector (HB&IS surveys 2007 and conducted by the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam in collaboration with the IRD. Results from these surveys report a valueadded gap more than three times in favour of formal household businesses (Cling et al., 2010; Demenet et al., 2010) . Turning back to the VHLSS panel, the gap is narrower when the comparison is based on labour productivity figures. Indeed, the average amount of generated value added per worker in formal NFHBs is 'only' twice that generated by informal NFHBs.
Industrial and regional distributions of formal and informal NFHBs also indicate interesting features. First, as regards the distribution of household businesses across three industrial groups (manufacturing, trade and services), the NFHB activity is quite diversified. Among these sectors, trade activities (mainly retail sale) take the lead with 47 percent of informal NFHBs and 54 percent of formal NFHBs. The difference between the two groups of NFHBs is that the formal businesses are less concentrated in manufacturing sector than their informal counterparts.
11
Regarding entrepreneurs' main characteristics, we observe a significant difference in gender and education of formal and informal NFHBs' entrepreneurs. Formal NFHBs are operated in greater proportion by male entrepreneurs (52 percent versus 40 percent for informal NFHBs). Informal NFHBs are more likely to be run by entrepreneurs with lower levels of education.
We further introduce in Table A3 statistics on proxies of family and kinship ties and external resources of households and entrepreneurs ('social network capital'). A first important proxy of social network is the share of the population from the same ethnic group in the district in which a household resides. This share is computed using the household questionnaire of the VHLSS 2004 using population weights such that it exactly reflects the true share in the total population. Districts correspond to countrywide neighbourhoods of 402 localities in Vietnam. As Grimm et al. (2012) argue, who also retain this approach, this measure of ethnic concentration is an obvious measure of the potential intensity of family and kinship ties, and more broadly community ties.
12
However, while Vietnam is a multi-ethnic country with over fifty distinct groups (54 are recognized by the Vietnamese government), each with its own language, lifestyle, and cultural heritage, many of them are concentrated in the mountains of the central highlands of Vietnam (they are known as Montagnard or Degar). The Kinh (Viet) are by far the most numerous ethnic group, representing more than 85 percent of the total population. Hence, ethnic concentration is high. But whether it is likely to act in favour of kin pressure, or the reverse, is not clear. For instance, members of very small ethnic communities being surrounded by large ethnic groups are likely to attach more importance to social ties and hence to maintain and/or reinforce them.
13
Looking at these shares of the population from the same ethnic group, no significant difference can be found between formal and informal entrepreneurs: a high ethnic concentration (more than 90 percent) is reported for both types of entrepreneurs.
In addition, the additional module on non-farm activities in VHLSS 2004 provides information for constructing a set of dummies reflecting some characteristics of the entrepreneurs' social network capital, in a broad sense: whether the NFHB head is member of a professional association, whether he/she has any relationship with other NFHBs doing the same activity and owned by his/her relatives or friends; whether initial capital of the business was financed by loans from family members, relatives or friends; and whether the entrepreneur inherited the NFHB 11 Further disaggregated figures show that the most frequent activities found among informal manufacturing NFHBs are food and beverage processing and garment and textiles, leather product and other handicrafts. Besides, sampled NFHBs are not equally distributed across regions. Northeast and Central Highlands are the less represented regions (from 2 to 7 percent) for both formal and informal NFHBs. Among informal NFHBs, about half are located in the two river delta regions, namely the Red River in northern Vietnam and the Mekong River in southern. With the exception of the Northeast and the Central Highlands representing only 5 percent of the informal NFHBs' sample, the other half of informal NFHBs are uniformly allocated to the four remaining regions (Northwest, North Central Coast, Central Coast and Southeast). 12 A recent World Bank report on Vietnam's ethnic minorities provides illustrations supporting this view (World Bank, 2009 ). Surveys on ethnic minorities indicate for example that only 18 percent of ethnic minorities surveyed had ever ventured outside of their home province. Higher mobility among the dominant ethnic group (the Kinh) gives them social advantages such as wider exposure to information and more extensive social networks. 13 As examples of the strength of ethnic ties, the World Bank (2009) reports that many small minorities declare being unwilling to divide families up for economic gain, such as leaving one's family behind to engage in labour migration, or having cultural barriers to economic transactions, such as norms against charging interest on loans from kin and neighbours.
from the kin, friends or other acquaintances. Interestingly, we do not observe much difference across formal and informal entrepreneurs in terms of these social network resources.
Concerning the household-associated characteristics of the NFHBs, we construct two different types of variables: those related to household members and their socio-economic characteristics, and commune level information where the households reside. The former group comprises mostly the activity portfolio of the members (employment composition 14 ), the intensity of nonfarm activities, the total expenditures and amount of transfers received and given of the household running the considered NFHBs. The second group of variables includes the share of poor households (ratio of poor households to total number of households in the communes), dummy variables indicating whether the commune is involved in the UN programme P135 devoted to poverty reduction of minority groups 15 , whether the commune is a craft village 16 , and whether the commune benefits from government project/programme on employment creation, which may attenuate employment pressure on the households. Lastly, we compute the inmigration rate (as the ratio of the in-migrants in the commune to the total population of the commune) as a proxy of social pressure exerted by migration inflows on households (under the form of household transfers and employment opportunities in the community for example). These commune variables are only available for a sub-sample of households.
As the database provides information on received/transferred money or goods from/to friends and relatives, which were not related to economic transactions of households, we finally construct variables reporting the amounts of inter-household transfers. These variables are further described in the dedicated Section 5 when we come to analyse their determinants.
Productivity of hired versus family labour
Empirical strategy
We start by estimating simple production functions where we introduce two forms of labour as factor inputs, controlling for the physical capital and the determinants of the overall productivity of the firm, including characteristics of the head of the NFHB and household characteristics. As explained in the data section, the survey allows distinguishing only 'paid' versus 'unpaid' labour in NFHBs. We thus have to make the assumption that unpaid labour essentially reflects kin and/or extended family labour. Comparing the contribution of these two types of labour would give an idea whether related workers are on average less productive than hired workers (related or not) which could be recruited on the market for the same pay.
We first assume that the production function facing NFHBs is a Cobb-Douglas type:
(1) ln = + ln + ln +∑ + Where represents the output of NFHB i at time t (the annual value added), K stands for physical capital of the NFHB, and L for labour inputs.
is a vector of k time-varying or invariant control variables including the NFHB head's sex, education, experience, number of hours worked (and that of his/her spouse), household characteristics such as the dependency ratio, the activity portfolio of the household members, the number of NFHBs run by the same household 17 , a set of important NFHB characteristics (age of the firm, seven regional dummies, eight branch of activity dummies), and a time dummy to capture common shocks to the firms over time.
In this production function, physical capital (K) of the NFHB is captured by the log value of initial capital declared in 2004, and is complemented by the log value of the total assets declared by the households in both years. Labour input is expressed in numbers of workers engaged in the NFHBs' activity. We further assume that labour services are produced using family labour, L f , and hired labour, L h , both expressed in numbers of workers, by a generalized quadratic production function:
Combining equation (2) in (1) yields a generalized production function allowing any elasticity of substitution between family and hired labour:
A requirement for the overall production function (3) to be concave is that equation (2) is concave. Necessary conditions for this are that and are non-positive and that the marginal products of ln(L f ) and ln(L h ) are non-negative. These requirements could be imposed when estimating equations (3), but we do not do so as it would necessitate imposing non-linear constraints on the parameters which is difficult to implement using fixed effects regressions with a panel. Note that if = = =0, equation (3) reduces to a simple Cobb-Douglas production function. In one set of regressions, we will only impose the restriction of constant return to scale, i.e. + + (1 − )=1 or + =1, and then check the consistency of the generalized form.
Let us now discuss a few potential econometric issues, which are common to the estimation of production functions in general. First, we have to deal with the issue of heterogeneous labour quality attached to the two types of labour. Unfortunately, the VHLSS does not provide much information on qualitative features of the workers employed in the NFHBs. To help control for unobservables specific to both types of labour, additional controls are introduced. We include the HB head's number of hours worked in the past twelve months in the controls, which is deemed to be a proxy of the entrepreneur's labour effort. We also make use of the number of hours worked by his/her spouse, assuming that the household's labour effort in the business is a combination of both, although no inference can be made from the survey about the precise proportion of the spouse's hours that is devoted to the NFHB itself. Besides, we add four dummies of the activity portfolio of the household members, which might be good proxies of the available human capital inside the household (see details in Table A1 ).
In addition to observed heterogeneity in labour quality, there is an unobserved dimension of the business itself. Assuming that business heterogeneity is time-invariant, we deal with this problem using business (NFHB) fixed effect regressions. Third, biases may be present in the estimates of the inputs elasticities if these factors are correlated with the residual, for instance if managers alter their labour inputs in response to demand shocks or if there are measurement errors in the explanatory variables (notably physical capital).
18 Unfortunately, with a two-year panel, it is impossible to address this issue using standard instrumental variable approaches exploiting for instance lagged values of the explanatory variables as instruments. Fourth, labour supply of the kin might be endogenous to business performance, and so to value added. Higher profits may attract more members of the extended family. Assuming decreasing marginal returns to labour, this would downward bias the contribution of family labour. We could try to instrument family labour using variables exploiting exogenous sources of variation in unpaid labour (for instance community or village level variables). As using this information would necessitate reducing the size of our firm sample (these variables are only available for a sub-sample of households), we refrain from this option.
Adding the household business i heterogeneity component µ in the model then yields:
Finally, disaggregating family and hired labour in production functions raises the problem of zero observations in some firms. For this reason, many studies implicitly assume equal productivity and aggregate hired and family labour to determine their effect on firm performance. Other studies still separately consider hired and family labour variables in the model, but then they limit their sample to firms (or farmers) who used positive values of these two types of labour and so drop cases with zero observations. As it is not satisfying to discard a part of the sample, other papers treat the zero-observations case by using values of one, or an arbitrarily small number greater than zero for the log input to be computed. As shown by Battese (1997) , this procedure may result in important bias in the estimates of the production function. Following Battese et al. (1996) , Battese (1997) and Onumah et al. (2010) , we avoid these procedures and choose to set the log-value of the zero-observation of labour to zero instead, while controlling for dummy variables equal to one if the number of family (respectively hired) labour is positive. The intercept coefficients for these two dummies ensure that we use the full data set at our disposal and that we obtain estimators without any bias.
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We always correct standard errors for intra-cluster correlations, either at the district or at the commune levels depending on the regressions considered.
Empirical analysis
In this section, we look at how the two types of labour impact on the household firms' performance. We model the annual value added of the firms, expressed in Log. In Table A4 of the Appendix, we report on various production function results for the overall sample of NFHBs, while summary regression coefficients for formal and informal NFHBs are reported in Table 1 below. Each table includes a set of seven specifications using pooled OLS over the two years (columns (A) to (C)) and fixed effect regression models (columns (D) to (G)). Columns (A) and (D) report the estimates of the Cobb-Douglas (CB) production function (1) using OLS and fixed effect (FE) estimators, while columns (B), (C), (F) and (G) present the coefficient estimates of the extended (generalized) production function (3) allowing non-null elasticity of substitution between family and hired labour. Columns (C), (E) and (G) report regressions imposing a linear constraint (constraint linear regression, CLR) on the elasticities of physical capital and labour inputs, i.e. constant returns to scale. In the models (E) and (G), for a tractability reason, we exploit the panel structure of the data using a 'time-demeaning' method instead of introducing the business fixed effects explicitly.
Let us first focus on the production functions estimated for the overall sample of NFHBs (Table  A4 in Appendix). We add in the models a dummy indicating whether the business is informal. As expected, its coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 percent level or less in all regressions.
In the pooled OLS models, all else being equal, being an informal NFHB corresponds to a penalty in annual value added of about 28 percent (percentage computed as: (exp(coefficient)-1)*100). Controlling for the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of the NFHBs leads us to re-evaluate this penalty to nearly 12 percent, which suggests that unfavourable unobserved business characteristics are generally associated to poorly performing NFHBs in the informal sector.
Turning to the estimates of the input elasticities, the regressions overall show that physical capital and labour are both positively and significantly correlated to the value added of the NFHBs.
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The results especially highlight greater elasticities of labour compared to physical capital owned by the households. The regressions also almost always stress greater elasticities of hired labour compared to family labour. This is particularly true in the regressions of columns (D) to (G) where the models account for unobserved heterogeneity of the firms, which should then be considered as our preferred results. As shown in the data section, input factors greatly differ between formal and informal NFHBs, in particular the labour and physical capital inputs. This suggests that looking at mean estimations of the output elasticities using the samples of formal and informal businesses is certainly not very informative. We then turn to regressions differentiated by sector, which are summarized in Table 1 below.
The regressions for the formal and informal NFHBs exhibit somewhat sector-specific patterns. First, note that the elasticities of labour and physical capital are of the same order of magnitude as those estimated in various countries, in particular for African informal firms (see Vaillant et al., 2011; Grimm et al., 2012) . The pooled OLS Cobb-Douglas regression for the formal NFHBs (column (A)) show non-significant differences in the elasticities of family and hired labour. By contrast, informal NFHBs display a greater productivity of hired compared to family labour: a one percent increase in the number of hired (respectively family) workers leads to an 78 (62) percent increase in the informal NFHBs' annual value added. Of course, these elasticities do not take into account time-invariant firm heterogeneity which could bias these estimates. Results in column (A) should then be compared to the fixed effect estimates reported in column (D). The gap between labour productivities widens in both cases. It is particularly large (and significant) for informal businesses who then exhibit a 45 percentage point difference between hired and family labour. Looking at these estimates, there is some evidence of a productivity differential between family and hired labour, at least in the informal sector. We then turn to the extended production function (PF) where elasticity of substitution between family and hired labour is allowed. The signs of the coefficients on the interacted family and hired labour variables (the marginal product of hired and family labour) are generally negative and insignificant for informal NFHBs, but shift direction between OLS and FE estimations for formal NFHBs (columns (B) and (F)). In the case of informal firms, this would mean that hired labour and family labour are substitutes rather than complement. However, in our preferred regressions controlling for time-invariant unobserved business heterogeneity (columns (F) and (G)), none of the augmented coefficients appear to be significant. In addition, a necessary condition for the production function to be concave is that the estimated coefficients on the squared terms of labour are non-positive, which is never observed in columns (C), (F) and (G). We performed F tests of the joint significance of the augmented coefficients (squared values and interacted labour inputs) showing that we cannot reject the null (at the 10 percent level) that the coefficients are jointly zero in both sectors (p-values: 0.32 and 0.67 for the formal and informal sectors respectively and estimates of column (F)). All this prompt us to reject the extended PF in favour of the simpler Cobb-Douglas specification.
At last, by imposing the restriction of constant returns to scale while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and using a Cobb-Douglas PF (column (E)), we obtain the following result: formal NFHBs exhibit roughly the same elasticities of hired and family labour, amounting to about 44 percent. By contrast, hired labour seems more productive in informal NFHBs. For these informal businesses, the ratio of marginal productivities, /1 − , is 0.85. Thus, family labour is less productive than hired labour in these types of businesses. In addition, the data do not support the hypothesis of substitutability between family and hired labour, which is consistent with the idea that managerial and supervisory tasks may be mainly performed by family members (see Section 2.4).
Let us now briefly discuss other interesting coefficients.
21 Once unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for, the effect of having no initial capital, initially positive and significant for formal NFHBs, vanishes. Informal NFHBs still positively benefit from having no initial capital, even in the fixed effects estimations. Intercept coefficients for family labour (fami_lab) and hired labour (paid_lab), that is the dummies indicating positive values of the number of workers, are both estimated to be significantly positive. This implies that there could be biased estimators of the parameters of the production functions without inclusion of these dummies. However, fixed effect estimations appear to wash out this heterogeneity effect of the NFHBs. Finally, controlling for the hours worked by the entrepreneur and his/her spouse appears to be important. Labour efforts of the entrepreneur and his/her spouse are always positively associated with the informal businesses output. For formal NFHBs, only the workload of the manager is significantly associated with greater value added. 22 We now turn to an investigation of the determinants of the transfers received and given by the households in order to identify the key determinants of potential redistributive pressure exerted by the kinship ties and extended family on the NFHBs. We also take this opportunity to identify possible 'community effects' on these transfers. 21 To save space, full regression estimates are available from the authors upon request. 22 We also tried interactions of these two variables whose coefficients turned out to be always insignificant. In addition, we ran regressions without inclusion of the entrepreneur' and his/her spouse' labour hours to check possible changes in the various elasticities of labour and capital. These estimates are not shown to save space, but let us note here that previous results are sometimes only slightly quantitatively changed, not qualitatively. In particular, the gaps between hired and family labour coefficients remain the same with and without work hours included. Besides, the coefficient levels of the various elasticities are unsurprisingly unchanged in the fixed effect regressions.
Linking Family, Kinship Ties, Community and Household Transfers
The VHLSS asks households to report what they have transferred to and received from other households in-cash or in-kind. In-kind transfers are given in self-estimated money values. The collected data are aggregate inflows and outflows over the past year, except for the loan section of the VHLSS questionnaire for which each transaction is recorded with the partner type.
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Description of household transfers received and given
The given transfers can be disaggregated into several types of outflows, i.e. transfers for different purposes. These include wedding and engagement ceremony, funerals and death anniversaries, entertainment and parties, gifts, donation, support, lending and contribution to revolving credit groups. The received transfers are separated into inflows from senders who are not household members, either from abroad or as a form of domestic in-cash remittances. Zylberberg (2010) shows that only 10 percent of households in rural areas had zero outflows during the past year. Foreign remittances concern a much smaller part of the population (4 percent of households in rural areas). In line with the intuition that foreign migrants support financially aging households, the receiving households are more urban, older and less active than the average household receiving domestic remittances and gifts only. Regarding informal loans, 15 percent of households have lent to another household in the past year. In this paper, we have aggregated the total given and total received transfers (in thousands VND) and computed the net transfers as the difference between the total transfers received and given.
Descriptive statistics of these transfers in Table A3 in Appendix show that they are largely practiced by the households holding NFHBs. Only 10 and 12 percent of households with formal and informal NFHBs, respectively, have no transfers at all (regarding both inflows and outflows). On average, the amount received is not much higher than the amount given for both households. This would imply, to some extent, the diversity of social ties and relationships of the households holding NFHBs.
The effects of kinship, family ties and community on household transfers
In this sub-section we explore to what extent family, kinship ties and community level characteristics have an effect on given and received transfers. To this end, we run regressions of the households' given, received and net transfers on a set of explanatory variables, including household characteristics, in particular the household total consumption expenditures, which is used as a proxy of the household available resources (excluding received transfers). The results are reported in Table A5 .
We distinguish two different types of households: those running only one NFHB (either formal or informal) and those running several NFHBs (two or more, the maximum being four). 24 The 23 Zylberberg (2010) makes use of these transfers (2004) (2005) (2006) to evaluate the extent to which Vietnamese villages compensate for natural disasters, in particular the occurrence of typhoons, by reallocating resources in the community. 24 For simplicity, we do not distinguish the informality of NFHBs here as it would complicate the presentation and interpretation of the estimates. In our regressions samples, less than 2 percent of households running at least one formal NFHB report no given transfers, and less than 4 percent of the households running at least one informal NFHB. For received transfers, these proportions are respectively 10 percent and 11 percent.
reason for this distinction is that splitting activities may be a household strategy to avoid demands from the extended family, together with diversifying risks, because it is easier to hide several smaller enterprises than one large enterprise. So our assumption is that the determinants of transfers may differ according to these two types of households. We use random effect regressions at the business level for all three dependent variables, thus assuming that household business heterogeneity reflects to some extent household heterogeneity. 25 Regarding the choice of main explanatory variables, in addition to the household log total expenditure, we control in these regressions for gender, age, ethnicity, education and experience of the owner of the NFHBs, age of the firm, the household dependency ratio, the activity portfolio of the household members, and regional and time effects (these estimates are not all reported to save space).
We add measures of the potential intensity of family and kinship ties together with variables using information at the commune or village level, where the households reside. All these community variables may determine the propensity to hire kin-labour, and thus may exert detrimental (or positive) effect on the business performance (or technical efficiency, see next section), and in such case we make the assumption that this would partly be reflected in the links they have with transfers given and received by households. For instance, the in-migration rate may act as a proxy of social pressure on household transfers and employment opportunities in the community. This variable is assumed to influence positively the given transfers. Recall that these last variables are only available for a sub-sample of households, which reduces the regression samples.
The models of given transfers yield highly significant and large coefficients for the log total expenditures (columns (2), (5) and (8)). The estimate in column (2) for all households suggests that an increase of expenditures by one percent leads to an increase in given transfers by more than 110 percent. This is exceptionally high.
26 Given the role of measurement error and other sources of bias, we should not take this value too seriously, but it at least suggests that households have, given their rather low household resources, a relatively high propensity to transfer.
Turning to the social pressure proxies, we find that the share of the population from the same ethnic group in the district is significantly correlated to received and given transfers (columns (1) and (2)). However, its effect is only significant for given transfers of households running one NFHB (column (5)). This confirms the suspicion that ethnic concentration is positively correlated to social pressure exerted on households, which is revealed here under the form of outflow remittances.
Another proxy for social pressure exerted on the entrepreneur's business is computed as the share of the family workers employed in the NFHBs (ratio of the number of family workers to total workers). This share of family workers is significantly and positively related to net transfers (columns (3) and (6)). This effect is difficult to interpret, but may reflect the fact that only households with large resources, holding total income constant, may be able to employ high proportions of -and so support materially -workers from the extended family in the household. 25 Indeed, Hausman's specification tests could not reject the null hypothesis of a non-systematic difference in the fixed effect and random effect estimators, meaning that the random effect estimator is efficient and may be preferred. In addition, this allows us to recover the effect of time-invariant covariates, such as commune level variables, which are averaged over the two years. 26 For comparison purposes, we ran the same regressions but replacing the log total expenditures by the log value added of the business. The respective correlation coefficients for all households, those running one NFHB, and those running several NFHBs are 0.12, 0.9, and 0.22 which are in the same range as that obtained by Grimm et al. (2012) , i.e. 18 percent.
Residing in a commune involved in the P135 programme has a negative effect on received transfers from other households (columns (1) and (4)), while this positively affects the net transfers of those households running several NFHBs (column (9)). This may reflect the fact that once P135 is in place in a village, it exerts an eviction effect of other forms of mutual social support. 27 Residing in a craft village exerts the same negative effect on received transfers, and may be explained by the existence of other forms of professional support for the community members in such villages. The share of poor households in the community is only significantly correlated to net transfers, in particular for those households running several NFHBs. Hence, the poorer the village, the weaker the available resource stemming from household transfers. Households residing in communes benefiting from a programme on employment creation are generally better off in terms of received transfers, even if we deduct the transfers that these households provide to other households, i.e. by considering the net transfers equations (columns (1), (3), (4) and (6)). Finally, somewhat contradicting prior expectations, in-migration exerts a positive effect on received and net transfers, in particular for the households running several NFHBs (columns (3), (7) and (9)). This may reflect a size effect of the population in the community, although we control for regional effects (but not at the commune level). In addition, the fact that the in-migration rate only affects positively the received transfers of households with several NFHBs may show that creating several enterprises within the household (by diversifying the business for instance) may be a strategy to employ more people from the kin, and potentially to receive greater additional resources from other households.
Finally, these results are consistent with the idea that family, kinship and community level information is relevant in explaining the transfer behaviour of households in Vietnam, and thus also reflects to some extent the sharing obligations of the households. These proxies of redistributive pressure seem then to be good candidates to explain the distribution of inefficiencies of those small firms managed within the households.
Kinship Ties, Social Network Capital and Household
Business Efficiency
Concept of technical efficiency and empirical strategy
After having focused on the output elasticities of family versus hired labour, the link between household transfers, family, kinship ties and community characteristics, we will now look at technical efficiency of the NFHBs (Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 2008) . The question asked here is whether kinship ties and social network capital affect the business' technical efficiency, i.e. whether even after having efficiently allocated family and hired inputs entrepreneurs would use them in a sub-optimal way. Inefficiency (or efficiency, depending on the sign considered) is usually defined as the distance which separates the firm's frontier of outputs from the observed realization of outputs given the entrepreneur's and firm's observed characteristics.
Social networks in general may or may not help operate efficiently. Entrepreneurs that are confronted with strong pressure for redistribution from the kin may produce less efficiently and realize a lower output than they in principle could with the same amount of resources. Hence, in case we find evidence for a sub-optimal use, it would hint to adverse incentive effects, possibly related to family labour, but also to other forms of social network pressures. Such adverse incentive effects could arise if entrepreneurs feel that everything they earn needs to be shared with the extended family or that higher earnings may even attract more family members that have to be employed by the firm.
By contrast, positive effects of social network capital on technical efficiency might be expected if the entrepreneur's social capital acts as a positive externality on his/her activity. For example, the entrepreneur may be subject to knowledge spillovers when starting the business, i.e. exposed to the diffusion of management skills amid the kin network. Grimm et al. (2012) find for instance some evidence for West African informal entrepreneurs that family and kinship structures within the city enhance labour effort and the use of capital, maybe because local networks help overcome labour market imperfections.
The usual procedure is to estimate stochastic frontier production functions that are the production possibility frontiers for a given set of inputs using an error components model (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Greene, 2008) . 28 Hence, most studies using cross-sectional datasets infer the efficiency dispersion from the skewness of the production function residuals. In our case, we use panel data so that we can rather infer the technical efficiency term using actual estimates of the firm unobserved component in the production function, i.e. the business fixed effects. This approach is notably retained in Söderbom and Teal (2004) who benefit from a fiveyear panel data on Ghanaian manufacturing firms. Admittedly, our short panel of businesses incites us to be cautious with the interpretation of these fixed effects. Nonetheless, we believe that this procedure is less subject to debate than methods estimating technical efficiency from stochastic frontiers which require strong parametric assumptions in order to identify technical efficiency from pure production function residuals.
We estimate the fixed effects based on the output production functions reported in Column (D) of the summary Table 1 . We then use these as our measures of technical inefficiency. The estimates of the fixed effects are simply obtained by averaging the predicted residuals of the fixed effect production functions by household business (which is identical to regressing the level residuals on business dummies). By normalizing the estimated fixed effect so as to bound it in the (0,1] interval, we obtain the efficiency index, , such as:
, where ̂) *+ is the sample maximum of the estimated fixed effects, and ̂ is the estimated fixed effect for NFHB i. This implies that a score equal to 1 indicates efficiency or 'frontier' technology, and a score less than 1 implies inefficiency of the considered NFHB.
Distribution and determinants of household business efficiency
Figure 1 in Appendix shows the distributions of the efficiency scores computed separately for formal and informal NFHBs. The sample means of these distributions are respectively 0.12 and 0.15, with a somewhat large right-skewness (the overall NFHB sample average is 0.14).
29
Compared to previous studies, in particular that of Söderbom and Teal (2004) who use the same methodology, our estimates of the firm efficiency appear fairly low. Söderbom and Teal (2004) report a firm efficiency at the mean of 0.53 for Ghanaian manufacturing firms. At least two explanations could explain this difference. One is that they use a five-year panel to estimate efficiency, while we 'only' have a two-year panel. Another reason, which we believe is the most relevant, is that their sample comprises rather large firms, with an average size of 67 employees. This is clearly not the characteristic of our sample of household businesses with no more than 10 employees. Interestingly enough, technical efficiency appears to be slightly higher for informal NFHBs, but this difference is not statistically significant. One may expect a higher efficiency of informal businesses due to possible administrative burden borne by formal NFHBs compared to informal ones. A higher efficiency of informal businesses may also explain the weak incentive of Vietnamese NFHBs to get formalized, perhaps to escape governmental taxes, but also to avoid administrative overload which may reduce technical efficiency. However, this does not seem to be so relevant here (insignificant difference), and so we should not push this interpretation further.
We then look at the distribution of technical efficiency along two social network dimensions. First, technical efficiency is significantly lower for NFHBs employing only family workers compared to NFHBs having some proportion of hired workers (respectively, 0.13 versus 0.20, the difference being statistically significant at the 1 percent level). This result is thus in accordance with the idea that entrepreneurs that are confronted with strong employment pressure from the kin may produce less efficiently. Second, dividing the sample of NFHBs according to the share of people from same ethnicity as the household head in the NFHB's neighbourhood, we find that those NFHBs operating in an environment with less than 50 percent of the same ethnic group have a slightly lower technical efficiency than those operating in a highly ethnically concentrated neighbourhood (respectively, 0.11 versus 0.14; the difference being statistically positive at the 10 percent level). Although the difference is not large, this may confirm that local networks have positive effect on firm management, perhaps thanks to mutual support from the own community and/or facilitated knowledge spillovers.
In Table A6 , we regress the fixed effects estimates on time-invariant covariates 30 to identify possible effects of social network variables on the distribution of the NFHBs' efficiency. Not all the regression coefficients are reported in the table as we also control for sector (manufacturing, trade and services), business location (at home, fixed place in the street, itinerant), urban/rural area and regional effects. Three blocks of explanatory variables are introduced sequentially.
The first block concerns households' family and kinship network proxies, including the share of the same ethnicity in the locality, the share of family workers employed in the NFHB, net transfers, given transfers and predicted 'excess transfers'. Following Grimm et al. (2012) , this last variable is thought as an alternative measure of redistributive pressure using the information on actual transfers. Indeed, to avoid endogeneity problems, it is important to focus on potential pressure and not on actual pressure. More precisely, based on a regression of transfers given on the total household available resources (proxied by consumption expenditures plus received transfers), we estimate a residual that indicates whether a given household pays more or less transfers than the average household conditional on its consumption and received transfers levels. 31 This predicted 'excess transfers' should then measure 'forced' remittances.
The regressions in Table A6 show that while the share of the same ethnicity is significantly and negatively associated with inefficiency of informal NFHBs in columns (6) and (7) (positive coefficients indeed indicate positive effects on efficiency), the effects are always insignificant for formal NFHBs. By contrast, a greater share of employed family workers always plays a significant positive effect on inefficiency, thereby reducing NFHBs' technical efficiency. This confirms the descriptive statistics reported above and complements the results in Section 4.2 regarding the gap in labour productivities of hired vs. family labour. While net and given transfers do not seem to be associated with inefficiency, with the exception of a positive effect of net transfers for formal NFHBs (column (1)), the predicted 'excess transfers' are highly significant and play in different directions depending on the formality status of the NFHBs (columns (3) and (8)): positive and negative effect on business inefficiencies for formal and informal NFHBs, respectively. Hence, redistributive pressure under the form of excess transfers seems to be detrimental to formal NFHBs efficiency, while the reverse is true for informal businesses. This result is robust all along the set of estimated regressions.
We next turn to the second block of explanatory variables (columns (4) and (9)): proxies for the entrepreneurs' social network capital. The group of variables considered includes dummy variables indicating whether the NFHB head is member of a professional association; whether he/she has any relationship with other NFHBs doing the same activity and owned by his/her relatives or friends; whether initial capital of the business was financed by loans from family members, relatives or friends; and whether the entrepreneur inherited the NFHB from the kin, friends or other acquaintances. Few of these explanatory variables are significantly associated with NFHBs' efficiency. Two noticeable exceptions are the variable indicating whether the entrepreneurs benefited from a loan from the kin for starting the business (positive effect on efficiency of informal NFHBs only) and whether the NFHB was inherited from the kin or handed over by friends. This confirms the importance of financial constraints
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, insurance against risk, and intergenerational inheritance for successful entrepreneurship (see recent examples for respectively Mexico and West Africa in Bianchi and Bobba, 2010 and Pasquier-Doumer, 2012) . However, we observe that NFHB inheritance is generally negatively associated with efficiency.
The last block of covariates are the commune level variables introduced in Section 5.2 on the determinants of household transfers. We obtain two significant and apparently robust effects: NFHBs' efficiency, either formal or informal, is positively associated with being in communes involved in the UN programme P135 devoted to poverty reduction of minority groups. The share of poor households in the locality of the NFHBs has an expected positive effect on inefficiency, that is being in a poor commune is harmful to efficient business management, perhaps due to the presence of poor public infrastructure (electricity, water, etc.). Note that both effects are larger in magnitude for formal NFHBs.
Robustness checks: entrepreneurs' unobserved heterogeneity and business size
How much of the effects evidenced so far derives from personal unobserved characteristics of the entrepreneurs? Indeed, in addition to observed heterogeneity in labour quality, there is potentially an unobserved dimension of the entrepreneurs. If unobserved ability (or other unobservables) is firm-specific and time-invariant, this will not present us with a problem provided that we control for business fixed effects all along the regressions. However, if the unobservable is rather entrepreneur-specific (and not necessarily firm-specific) controlling for NFHB fixed effects does not solve this difficulty (recall that an entrepreneur can run several businesses in the same household).
We tackle this question through the use of an indirect indicator of unmeasured ability and motivation of the entrepreneurs (see Longhi and Brynin, 2010 for a similar approach). If such unmeasured characteristics are essentially time-invariant, we can quantify them by means of individual fixed effects resulting from earnings functions of the entrepreneurs. For this purpose, we benefit from a panel of individual earnings in the VHLSS for the years -2006 (see Nguyen, Nordman and Roubaud, 2011 . From this panel, it is then possible to extract the same sample of entrepreneurs used in this paper and to estimate their individual fixed effects. Fixed effects, which are individual-specific dummies, are then computed after a so-called within transformation, in which the individual average of each variable is subtracted from the variable itself. The earnings function used includes a set of demographic, human capital and job characteristics of the entrepreneurs and is described in details in Nguyen et al. (2011) . Table A7 reports on the same technical efficiency regressions as in Table A6 but including the entrepreneurs' heterogeneity component as an additional regressor. As it can be expected, provided that we consider this heterogeneity component as reflecting mostly ability 33 , this term is always highly significant and has a positive effect on the NFHBs' efficiency. Our purpose is to check whether our main previous results are robust to the inclusion of this entrepreneurs' heterogeneity component.
First, the effect of the share of ethnicity holds in columns (6) and (7), and also vanishes in column (8) when predicted 'excess transfers' replace actual transfers. By contrast, the significant negative effects of the share of family worker disappear for informal NFHBs, but remain stable for formal NFHBs. We may conclude that heterogeneity of the entrepreneurs was driving this effect for informal NFHBs (almost all employed workers in informal NFHBs are family workers), but not for formal NFHBs. Hence, a greater share of family workers does reduce formal NFHBs' technical efficiency. Finally, predicted excess transfers measuring a high redistributive pressure have the same highly significant and robust correlations.
Turning to the second block of covariates, we confirm the importance of benefiting from a loan from the kin for starting an informal business. By contrast, formal NFHBs inherited from the kin are less efficient. For informal NFHBs, other results are reinforced and new findings turn out (columns (9) and (10)): holding his/her unobserved heterogeneity constant, a manager being member of a professional association seems to benefit from his/her professional network in terms of technical efficiency. In the same vein, having a friend producing the same product is beneficial in terms of efficiency, perhaps thanks to knowledge spillovers and/or shared customers. Professional network capital thus appears to be important for business efficiency.
Finally, with regard to the commune level variables, the previous identified effects vanish (P135 dummy and the share of poor households). This provides some evidence that the entrepreneurs' heterogeneity component is somewhat associated with their geographical distribution in Vietnam: more able entrepreneurs may be attracted to certain localities, while low ability entrepreneurs are possibly located in certain poor communities. However, one new interesting result shows up: the share of in-migrants in the commune exerts a significant and strong negative effect on business efficiency. This result corroborates previous findings on the adverse effect of employment demands from the kin, which would be expressed here under the form of employment pressure exerted by migration inflows on households.
33 Of course, while the innate ability or the 'talent parabola' is commonly stressed in the literature, many other interpretations of this component can be put forward. For instance, the entrepreneurs' heterogeneity may have to do with more efficient social networks to start and manage a business.
As a last robustness check, we introduce a set of interactions of the social network variables with a variable counting the number of workers in the NFHBs. 34 The idea is that there might be some heterogeneity of the effects of kinship and social network capital depending on the size of the NFHBs. We use the specification of regressions (4) to avail ourselves of the full sample of household businesses. The results of this exercise are reported in Table A8 . We find no evidence of heterogeneous effects as all the coefficients on the interaction terms turn out to be insignificantly different from zero, with one interesting exception: all else being equal, technical efficiency is weaker for large informal businesses that were inherited from the kin. This might be interpreted as another evidence of the burden represented by employment of the kin for business performance, especially when the use of family labour is the norm due to family inheritance.
Conclusion
Using a two-year panel of non-farm household businesses (NFHBs) for Vietnam, this paper is a first attempt to shed light on the links between households' and entrepreneurs' social networks and household business performance. We address three related questions. One first question is whether we can find evidence of a differentiated effect of employment of members of the extended family versus hired workers on the business performance. Is there a productivity differential between family and hired labour? Then, to identify the driving forces of possible social redistribution (or kinship pressure) on these small household firms, we analyse the determinants of transfers received and given by households running businesses using information on the households' and entrepreneurs' social networks and on the commune where the households reside: what are the extent, intensity and determinants of potential redistributive pressure exerted by the extended family, and borne by households running household businesses, notably under the form of inter-household transfers received and given? Finally, using these key determinants of social interactions, we examine the links between, on the one hand, family and kinship ties, social network capital, and community level characteristics and, on the other hand, the household businesses' technical efficiency: what are the respective effects of these different dimensions of social networks on the distribution of business technical efficiency?
A cross-cutting issue in our study is that all these analyses are performed separately for formal and informal businesses so that we can identify any differentiated effects depending on the informality status of the firms. By having a systematic look at the existence of heterogeneous effects depending on whether the household business operates in the formal or in the informal economy, we can ask whether kinship ties and social network capital is, for instance, more critical in the informal economy, as there is there a lack of formal institutions to support access to factor inputs. This allows us to examine whether the hypothetical adverse effects of family and kinship ties may be more prevalent in an informal context.
Controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of the NFHBs, we first find evidence that being an informal NFHB corresponds to a penalty in annual value added of about 30 percent. Regressions on the total sample of businesses almost always stress greater elasticities of hired labour compared to family labour. However, disaggregating the sample by sector, we find that formal NFHBs exhibit roughly the same elasticities of hired and family labour. By contrast, the gap in labour productivities is particularly large (and significant) for informal businesses. For this type of household firms, hired labour seems more productive, with a gap of roughly 15 34 Given the sample sizes, it is problematic to run segmented regressions according to business sizes. percentage points. Looking at these estimates, there is then evidence of a productivity differential between family and hired labour in the informal sector. Admittedly, although we control for a wide range of the entrepreneurs' and households' characteristics, the issue of heterogeneous labour quality attached to the two types of labour might still be at play here. However, in this regard, the fact of finding a clear divergence between estimated labour productivities of hired and family labour in the formal sector on one side, and in the informal sector on the other side -in particular by using exactly the same methodology and controls -would suggest that other mechanisms than pure statistical artefact are at work. In addition, the data do not support the hypothesis of substitutability between family and hired labour, which seems consistent with the idea that managerial and supervisory tasks may be mainly performed by family members.
Regressions of inter-household transfers provide then insights on the determinants of the potential pressure endured by household business entrepreneurs. Our results are consistent with the idea that family, kinship but also community level features exert an effect on the size and type of transfers to and from households in Vietnam. We first confirm the high propensity of households to transfer given their household resources. Also, with large external resources, holding total income constant, households seem to be able to employ higher proportions of workers from the extended family in the household. We then shed light on positive and significant correlations between ethnic concentration and transfers given to other households. Some community level variables also exert a significant effect on transfers. Among them, we find that the poorer the village, the weaker the available resource coming from other households. In addition, in-migration rate in the community is positively correlated to the received transfers of households running several NFHBs. This may illustrate that creating several businesses within the household (by diversifying the business for instance) may be a strategy to employ more people from the kin, and potentially to receive greater additional resources from other households.
Turning to the analysis of technical efficiency, our purpose is to identify whether managers use the combination of family and hired labour in a technically efficient and optimal way. A suboptimal use may suggest adverse incentive effects related to family labour. Such adverse incentive effects could arise if entrepreneurs feel that everything they earn needs to be shared with the extended family or that higher earnings may even attract more family members that have to be employed by the firm, as the transfer regressions suggest.
Interestingly, on average, technical efficiency is not significantly different across formal and informal NFHBs. Finding lower technical efficiency in the formal sector would have supported the traditional 'exit hypothesis' of the informal economy, also known as the 'legalist approach', considering that the informal sector is made up of micro-entrepreneurs who prefer to operate informally to evade the economic regulations (Perry et al., 2007) . In this framework, lower technical efficiencies of firms in the formal sector would be explained by the administrative burden borne by formal NFHBs compared to informal ones. However, this assumption does not seem to be relevant for Vietnamese NFHBs, at least with our data (see Nguyen et al., 2011 , for further evidence on this).
By investigating the social network determinants of technical efficiency, we find that those NFHBs operating in an environment with less than 50 percent of the same ethnic group have a significantly lower technical efficiency than those operating in a highly ethnically concentrated neighbourhood. Local networks may then have positive effect on firm management, perhaps thanks to mutual support from the own community and/or knowledge spillovers. Interestingly, this effect is always insignificant for formal NFHBs.
By contrast, a greater share of employed family workers always plays a significant negative effect on efficiency, in particular that of formal NFHBs. Hence, the adverse effects of family labour are revealed differently depending on the sector in which the businesses operate: while productivity of family labour is weaker than that of hired labour for informal businesses, family labour rather reduces technical efficiency in the case of formal businesses. This result corroborates another one, possibly stressing the adverse effect of employment pressure from the community, which we identify through the importance of migration inflows in the village.
Other interesting differences across formal and informal businesses appear regarding the effect of redistributive pressure: while 'excess household transfers' seem to be detrimental to formal NFHBs efficiency, the reverse is true for informal businesses. This difference might be explained by the existence of reciprocity and mutual support in the occurrence in these transfers. Clearly, the exact nature of these transfers needs to be studied in more detail, but it is likely that they may provide, at some point, credit, labour, insurance and access to clients and markets.
Finally, using information on the entrepreneurs' social capital, we confirm the importance of unlocking financial constraints (on physical capital) and improving access to professional support for successful household entrepreneurship. First, we always find a positive effect on the informal business' technical efficiency of benefiting from a loan from the kin. Second, for these informal entrepreneurs, being a member of a business association or having a friend producing the same product is beneficial in terms of efficiency, perhaps thanks to knowledge spillovers and/or shared clienteles. Professional network capital thus appears to be one important ingredient of informal business performance. This reveals the relevance of the idea that social network capital is more critical in the informal economy, where it may play a role of substitute of the scarce formal support mechanisms in access to and management of factor inputs. By contrast, we observe unclear effect of intergenerational inheritance of the business. All else being equal, technical efficiency is weaker for formal but also (large) informal businesses that were inherited from the kin. This might be interpreted as further evidence of the burden represented by employment of the kin for business performance, especially when the use of family labour becomes compulsory due to inheritance of the family business.
Appendix: Panel construction, Figures and Tables The construction of the panel of household businesses 2004-2006
The construction of the panel is a process of two steps: in the first step, we match different databases from different modules for each year, and then in a second step we match the years. This proves to be a complicated process as there arose ambiguities in both steps that we summarize below.
First, when matching files in the first step, there was no information in the non-farm household business modules of the 2004 VHLSS (M10 and M4C) to identify exactly the "most knowledgeable" household member to be considered as the head of the household business. As key variables for matching the different modules, we hence used, on one side, the household identifier together with the branch code of jobs of occupied members (available from the module on individual socio-demographics) and, on the other side, the branch code of non-farm businesses of the household. This may result in uncertainties or non-matched cases since there might have been errors during the coding of branches. To overcome this issue, we first only retained household occupied members who were identified in the module of employment as engaged in non-farm household activities as their main job. This helped excluding from each household all the occupied members who were not working in non-farm household activities, whose industry codes of main job resembled that of other non-farm self-employed members. For the nonmatched cases of household businesses with the occupied members of household as their main job, we then searched for matches by using information on the second job. The results of this matching process yield 3848 observations with information on both non-farm household business modules and characteristics of the entrepreneur.
The availability of information on the identifier of the household business head in the non-farm business module of the VHLSS 2006 made it possible to match directly each non-farm activity of households with the information on the individual characteristics of the correspondent member of the households who is identified as the head of the business. We found, however, some ambiguities when matching both modules each year and then the two years. These concerns the cases where a household member runs two or more businesses coded in the same branch. We decided to aggregate these businesses to obtain a unique production unit defined as the firm that generates the highest value added, with economic indicators (production, value added, inputs, etc.) computed as the sum of the related indicator of all the identical non-farm activities for each household. Regarding all other characteristics, such as those of the owner, we kept the values from the main production unit. In so doing, we found 174 cases in the 2004 wave, in which there were 171 households having non-farm household businesses (NFHBs) aggregated from two embryonic businesses, and 3 NFHBs made up of 3 businesses. Regarding the 2006 wave, this procedure yields only 34 cases. Notes: Other controls in the regressions include sector dummies (manufacturing, trade and services), business location dummies (at home, fixed place in the street, itinerant), urban/rural area and regional dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district or commune levels). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Other controls in the regressions include sector dummies (manufacturing, trade and services), business location dummies (at home, fixed place in the street, itinerant), urban/rural area and regional dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district or commune levels). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Other controls in the regressions include sector dummies (manufacturing, trade and services), business location dummies (at home, fixed place in the street, itinerant), urban/rural area and regional dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered at the district or commune levels). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
